Islamic revivalism and the Islamic intellectuals in the 1980s the case of Ali Bulaç by Öztimur, Neşe


... ~·· 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND THE ISLAMIC 
INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1980S; THE CASE 
OF ALİ BULAÇ 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Department of 
Political Science and Public Administration 
of 
Bilkent University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
by 
NEŞE ÖZTİMUR 
tarafmdan bcğrşlanmıştır. 
September 1992 
Bilkent University 
Li~ra.ry 
\ : 
Thcz~~ 
.8P 
~3 
.T8 
o~ 
i992 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ............................................... , . 1 
C:ıi.apter One . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 6 
I- Periods of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey ................• 6 
II- The role of the coup and Bureaucratic cadres in the ..... 8 
Islamic Revivalism of the 1980s 
III- The Islamic Press ....................................... 10 
Chapter Two 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM ..•.•......... 17 
I- Different Islamic Trends and their Labellings .........•. 17 
II- Modernization Attempts and Islamic Revivalism ..•........ 25 
I I I- The Ri se of I slamic In telleetual s . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Chapter Three 
ONE OF THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL: ALİ BULAÇ ............•...... 40 
I- Biography of Bulaç . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
II- Ali Bulaç's Thought ..................................... 41 
Conclusion ................................................... 77 
Bibliography ................................................. 86 
., 
.I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it 
is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public 
Administration. 
Assistant Prof. ümit ·cizre-Sakallıo~lu 
{l 
that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it 
is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public 
Administration. 
Assistant Prof. Jeremy Salt·' 
I certify that my opinion it 
"~ 
is fully adeqbate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public 
. ' Administration. 
Assistant Prof. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr 
r~~ z.~~7'~5c.~ 
I cert~fy that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it 
is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public 
Administration. 
Professor Ali Karaosmano~lu 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Although it is not possible to write their names one by one, 
I wish to thank all those people who have contributed in one way 
or another to my thesis from the beginning to the end. 
My first gratitude must be to all the instructors and 
Professors of the Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration. My special thanks go to Prof.Dr. Metin Heper who 
provided me with useful materials and made many helpful and 
inspring suggestions~ 
I offer my special thanks to my supervisor Assistant 
Professor Jeremy Salt who devoted much time to reading the first 
draft of the thesis. 
I also offer my special thanks to Assistant Professor ümit 
Cizre-Sakallıoglu who has been effective on me to love political 
science. 1 
Here, I wish to thank all Muslim peoples and groups who 
have devoted their hours for discussing my questions. They were 
always polite, friendly and helpful to me. I am indebted to 
the m for their sineere interest and help providing me a lot 
data for this study. 
Finally, I thank all my family, my father, my mother, my 
sisters and Murat for their endless support and patience during 
my thesis. . 
Neşe öztimur 
ii 
ÖZET 
1980 li yıllarda tüm dünya ülkeleri, yerleşik de~erlerin, 
normların yıkılınaya yüz tutup yerlerine yenilerinin inşa edilmeye 
başlandı~'ı bir döneme şahit olmuşlardır. Bu yıllar içerisinde 
Türkiye 
esti~i 
örne~inde en radikal rüzgarın Islami kesim yönünden 
kabul edilebilir. Nicelik ve nitelik açısından '80 li 
yıllarda yükselişe geçen İslami entellektüeller ise bu rüzgarı 
estiren en önemli kaynak olarak nitelendirilebilirler. 
Bu çalışmada 1980 li yıllar Türkiye'sinde İslami hareketin 
yükselişinin muhtelif sebepleri üzerinde durularak bu sebeplerin 
geçerlili~i, yine bu dönemde yükselişe geçmiş olan İslami 
entellektüel Ali Bulaç'ın söylemi ele alınarak analiz edilmeye 
çalışılmaktadır. Bu ba~lam içerisinde Ali Bulaç'ın ele 
alınmasının en temel sebebi; Bulaç'ın nitelik olarak di~er 
'islami entellektüellerden' farklılık göstermesi ve1 kendine içkin 
bir söylem geliştirmiş olmasıdır. 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
In the 1980s all of the world has witnessed great structural 
changes at the socio-political, cultural and economic levels of 
many countries. This decade is the era of challenging the 
settled values, norms, world-views and of attempting to 
construct new ones. In this decade, in Turkey. It can be 
accepted that the most radical wind was blowed by the Islamic 
side. Additionally the Islamic intellectuals with the ir 
quentitative and qualitative appreciation can be taken in to 
accent as the major source of this popularity. 
In this study, the possible causes of Islamic revivalism 
in Turkey during 1980s is examined and than the validity of this 
causes is analized with considering the one of the Islamic 
.:p '"<' 
·• ~e 
intellectuals (Ali Bulaç's) discourse; who gained his popularity 
again in \ this period. The main reason that why Ali Bulaç was 
chosen in th~·context of this study is his qualified differences 
from other Islamic intellectuals and his immanent discourse . 
• _7--l' 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s witnessed great structural changes at the socio-
political, · cultural and economic levels of many countries. In 
this decade and early 1990s the shape of the world changed 
drastically. The break-up of the eastern bloc and the transition 
to a free market economy, the emergence of an economic crisis, 
a deepening social problems in the US and the Iranian revolution 
of 1978, are among the crucial events in the past decade. So 
the 1980s and early 1990s are the era of challenging the status-
quo, settled values, life styles, world views and of 
attempting to construct new ones. 
In Turk~y the most radical challenges were represented by 
Islamic ııi.bv.~ments and trends. In the 1~80s Islamic trends 
continued to spread, representing a crucial aspect of Turkish 
' 
political,, economic and socio cultural life. 
It cah~be ~bserved vividly in Turkey during the 1980s that 
although Islamic movements and trends were fragmented and 
different in their rhetoric, many of them represented a reaction 
to4 . the west and modern i sm. 
Islamic intellectuals, in their radical response to the 
West and modernism, have occupied a certain place in the public 
and cultural life of Turkey today. Most of this group of 
ı 
---
intellectuals, 
education in 
universities. 
writers and journalists, did not recieve their 
religious institutions but rather secular 
Although their ideology is shaped by suspicion and 
hostility, towards western culture, 
with western culture.ı 
many of them are familiar 
Additionally, "compared with earlier Islamic intellectuals, 
contemporary Islamic thinkers show marked differences in the 
language of their discourses which is no langer formulated in 
terms of Islam-versus-the West but in terms of a conflict between 
the Islamic canception of society and the nature of the modern 
technocratic industrial civilization."Z 
In the rhetoric of many of the Islamic intellectuals of 
contemporary Turkey, modern society and modern societal 
relationships are strongly criticized. Many of them refuse to 
accept the constructedness of modern society. 3 Constructedness 
is a sociological concept used by Meeker in referri~g to identity 
in modern life. The transition from pre-industrial to industrial 
society, or a shift from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, means a 
shift from society based on structure to culture.4 
Modernity and a 'constructed' identity within modern life 
cause according to many of these Islamic intellectuals, feelings 
of ambivalence and abstractedness among many individuals. The 
only remedy is a return to the divine revelation of Allah and the 
2 
guidance of Quran and Sunna to solve the problems of individuals 
and satisfy their needs.s 
From this point of view Islamic revivalism and the rise of 
an Islamic intelligentsia in Turkey in the 1980s can be evaluated 
by considering their criticism and rejection of modernism and 
westernism. 
In my thesis, due to the difficulty in dealing with all of 
these Islamic intellectuals I have chosen only one, Ali Bulaç, 
and have evaluated his writings in the above mentioned framework. 
I have chosen Bulaç, because he is one among the most 
popular intellectuals of Turkish cultural life and among the most 
popular members of the Islamic fundamentalest movement. His 
writings reflect the rejection of rconstructedness' of identity 
in modern city life, and a desire for pure Islamic society based 
on the elimination of modernism in its technological, industrial 
and cultural aspects. 
He has both a theological and secular university education. 
Bul aç graduated from İstanbul University's department of 
sociology, a background which gives him originality and 
distinguishes him from other Islamic intellectuals. Bul aç 
explains and discusses social phenomena with sociological 
concepts. 
In this study my general thesis is that Ali Bulaç, one of 
the representatives of the Turkish Islamic fundamentalist 
3 
mavement in the 1980s, is actually under the influence of the 
modernist mentality which he rejects and is trying to alter. He 
is not successful in negating modernism in his rhetoric. 
In this scope I will deal with the fallawing themes; the 
place of Islamic ideology in the rhetoric of Ali Bulaç; his 
arguments against the West as the enemy of Islam; the 
alternatives he proposes in place of the unacceptable and_ 
rejected Western world. 
In the first chapter I will concentrate on same forms and 
mechanisms of Islamic revivalism in Turkey in the post 1980 era. 
In the second chapter I will deal with the theoretical framework 
of Islamic revivalism. I will try to make a categorization of 
different Islamic trends according to their response to the West 
and modernism. Alsa in this chapter I will try to evaluate same 
theoretical causes of Islamic revivalism. The thought of Ali 
Bulaç represents the third chapter. In this part Bulaç's 
' ~ritings will be evaluated in the light of his response to west 
and modernism. 
4 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN THE 1980S 
In Islamic countries, especially Iran, Egypt, Algeria, 
Sudan and Turkey a wave of religious feeling began to rise during 
the 1970s. In Iran this religious movement turned into 
revolution. By many journalists and politicians the same turn of 
events was expected in other countries. This did not happen in 
Turkey but Islamic movements and trends have occupied an 
important place in the public and cultural life of the country. 
I- PERIODS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN TURKEY: 
Since the beginning of the republican period in Turkey, 
three periods can be specified in terms of Islamic revivalism. 
The Şeyh Sait rebellion at 1925 can also be evaluated as a 
' > 
-religious fundamentalist uprising due to its reaction to the 
abolition of the caliphate by the new secular regime of Atatürk. 
Şeyh Sait was a very influential figure in the Nakşibendi order. 
The rebellion lies in its ethnic and religious charecter. It was 
p 
a Kurdish rebellion which affected eastern and southeastetn 
Turkey, and ended with the killing of more than 30,000 people, 
soldiers, rebels and civilians.ı After the suppression of the 
rebellion, its leaders were executed or sent into internal 
exile. Thereafter all tarikat activities were banned in Turkey. 
6 
There are still some debates about the Şeyh Sait rebellion; 
whether in essence is it a Kurdish ethnic rebellion or a 
religious one. 
Apart from the Şeyh Sait rebellion three periods can be 
taken as an indicative of Islamic revivalism in Turkey: 1. The 
e_arly 1950s, characterized as "a period of decompression of 
Islam in which for the first time in Republican history, 
peripherial folk Islam in the absence of rival orthodox 
tradition, became a participant in Turkish politics."2 2. The 
1970s, with the establishment of the National Salvation party 
and its consolidation as a major political force, have witnessed 
the Islamic uprising. 3 The liberal 1961 constitution and the 
opening of the system to ideological politics had altered the 
central role of religion as a belief system and religion as a 
political movement gained greater legitimacy in this period,4 
Also in the more pluralistic 1970s the country was shaped by many 
associations, parties and institutions, of which the Islamic 
version was one.s 
Although the pluralistic outlock of the 1970s was disrupted 
by the military coup in 1980, the "islamization process was 
supported by government elites, political elites and even by the 
coup leaders. 3. In this third wave of Islamic revivalism the 
chaning outlock towards Islam at the level of political elites 
became important. This point is crucial since "the changes in 
7 
the nature of Islamic politics and movements, the ir 
organizations, aims and strategies have been in large part 
shaped by the changing structure and ideology of the state and 
the centralist elites."6 
II- THE ROLE OF THE COUP AND BUREAUCRATIC CADRES IN THE ISLAMIC 
REVIVALISM OF THE 19808; 
The role of the political elites in the Islamic revivalism 
of the 1980s can be explained by some occurences that emerged 
after the 1980 coup. The major tendeney of the coup generals 
after the 1980 was to depoliticize Turkish society because of 
their view that the street violence and political instability of 
the 1970s resulted from the high degree of mass politicization 
encouraged by the 1961 constitution. Therefore the new 
constitution (1982) was constructed with the aim of restricting 
> 
-freedom of association and political activity: on the other hand 
islamization was encouraged in order to prevent ideological 
conflicts that led to the anarchy of the 1970s.7 
Thus the 1982 constitution made reference to Turkish morak 
r-: 
:..• 
and historical values. "This was a fundamental deviation from 
the original Atatürkian approach, according to which the 
consciousness of the new Turk was to be rooted in science. The 
military regime had resort to Atatürkian thought but this time 
fordiscovering Turkish historical and moral values."B 
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Moreover, these policies were picked up by the Motherland 
Party (ANAP) after it came to power. The role of ANAP in the 
rise of Islamic movements and the tarikat organizations should 
not be overlooked. Many ANAP parliamentarians were at least 
sympathetic to Islam, while at a higher level some were members 
of the different tarikats. The prime minister and ANAP leader 
Turgut özal's brother Korkut özal and their mother Hafize özal 
aroused public opinion in the 1980s because of their tarikat 
(Nakşibendi) membership. Additionally an ANAP deputy from 
Trabzon, Eyüp Aşık declared his membership of the Nakşibendi 
order (İskender Paşa Dergahı). 9 The istanbul province president 
of ANAP, Eymen Topbaş is a leading member of the Erenköy 
cemaat-i, one of the most powerfull tarikats, as well as being 
the publisher of the Altınoluk periodical which has an Islamic 
outlook although not so radical as to pr~pose a pure Islamic 
society based on the Quran and Sunna. 
Moreover some members of ANAP were participating in the 
activities of various tarikats although they were not active 
members of them. For instance Mustafa Taşar, a representative 
of the nationalist wing of ANAP made a speech at one meeting of 
the Kadiri order while Hafize Özal has taken the kind of prize 
from 'icmal' periodical due to her contribution to the tarikat 
activities, published by the same tarikat.ıo 
The sympathizers of 
positions in government 
--
Islam have also 
Ministeries, 
9 
acquired 
especially 
important 
National 
Education and inferior.ıı This strength of religious groups 
within özal's government has an undeniable role in the growing 
popularity of Islamic movements and trends at the public level. 
Having a 'muslim identity' has been used by many people in order 
to find to job and to get economic interest especially at the 
state institutions.ı2 
Additionally there was a strengthening of the political 
importance of the so-called Turk-Islam synthesis, formulated by 
a group of intellectuals who founded a club called the 
Intellectuals' Hearth. These intellectuals represented the new 
ideology which attempted to integra te Islamists and 
Nationalists.ı3 Bora and Canl4 call this Turk-Islam synthesis 
as the official ideology of the 12th September coup and 
government. Though, they argue that, same overlaps and 
conjuctions existing in the ideology of the Intellectuals'. 
Hearth and in the military civil bureaucracy made the ir 
communication more easier than the supposed ones. 15 According 
' 
_to these two writers the effectiveness of the lntellectuals' 
Hearth in the 12th September period and the post 1S80s era can be 
related to its role on the reconstitution of official ideology at 
this period.ıs 
III- THE ISLAMIC PRESS; 
There has been a salient increase in Islamic publishing 
activities reflected in the production of intellectual treaties, 
10 
tarikat journals and popular prayer manuals in the 1980s. 
However, Islamic groups do not have a consistent and coherent 
response to what they are rejecting. The fragmentation of 
Islamic groups can be observed in Islamic publications, each 
representing a distinct Islamic trend. Many Islamic 
organizations (tarikat's) coordinate their political activities 
with these newspapers and periodicals. Approximately 25 
magazines and journals are mentioned by Şaylan1 7 as an example of 
Islamic journals. In addition to these many books and handbooks 
have been published and edited by the various Islamic publishing 
organizations. Some are the writings of Turkish Islamic 
intellectuals while others are translated into Turkish from other 
languages. 
Moreovei, an increase in the number ~f imam-hatip schools 
has attracted attention in this period. "In the 1977-78 academic 
year, when the Justice Party, National Salvation Party, and 
National Action Party were in a coalition government, the number 
of middle-level imam-hatip schools jumped to 334. There were 376 
middle level and 341 lycee level, with a total of 134,517 
students. . In 1987-88 there were 376 middle level and 314 lycee 
level imam-hatip schools, with approximately 240.000 students. 
In the academic year 1985-86 there were 4400 official, secular, 
general middle level schools and 1206 lycees, with approximately 
2.4 million enrolled students. The ratio of imam-hatip school 
students reached the level of one to ten in the academic year 
1985-6, from the ratio of one to 37 in the academic year 1965-
ll 
---
6".18 Beyond the increased number of its students the other 
crucial matter for imam-hatip schools is that; some of its 
graduates have entered the university exams and won the different 
faculties of secular universities. Also, they are among the 
readers ·as well as writers of the radical Islamic journals and 
periodicals that were published during the 1980s. 
Moreover, it can be said that, technology and modern 
education have aften been used to reinforce rather than undermine 
Islamic belief and practice.ı 9 The message of Islam is no longer 
mediated only through local religious leaders. Islamic 
teachings are transmitted now through the mass-media, cassettes, 
books and journals. Thanks to mass-media and modern technology, 
the Islamic influence is not restricted to local areas. Muslim 
in villages, towns and cities are no longer simply dependent on 
local imams and ulema or the state-run media for the ir 
understanding of Islam.2o So, I can say that, at the Islamic 
revivalism of 1980s, the using of technology and modern methods 
have significant contribution, with enabling the easy 
communication among Islamic masses, on the spreading of 
diversity of interpretations. 
As a reflection of the diversification of Islamic 
organizations, there is an increase in the number of Islamic 
journals and periodicals at this period. Among them the journal 
of 'Islam' that published monthly represents the Nakşibendi 
outlook, namely the periodical 'Altınoluk', the Nurcus journal 
'Sızıntı', the Kadiri 'icmal' and 'örgüt'. 
12 
Many university educated Muslim women also participated in 
media activities in order to raise their voices. 'Mektep', 
'Bizim Aile' and 'Kadın ve Aile' represented the outlock of some 
Muslim women and its audiance is also represented by Muslim 
women. The main attack of these journals is against the secular 
feminists, and they are inviting enery women to return to the 
true path of the Islam. "Despite differences in style and 
content, all three Islamic journals aim basically at creating 
and/or increasing the Islamic consciousness of Turkish women 
through the development of an alternative culture of Islam in 
Turkey. To this end opposition to the norms of secular culture 
constitute the main banner of all three magazines." 21 
Additionally, it is visible that the protest mavement by 
veiled women constituted the most radical political participation 
within civil society in the 1980s. "The p~ohibition against the 
wearing of headscart of female Muslim students who consider 
'tesettür' to be an obsolute and definite command of God in the 
Quran, endured during the decade and led to a small scale 
political erisis in 1989 following mass demonstrations protesting 
the annulment of the bill by the Constitutional Court rendering 
the wearning of 'tesettür' legal in the universities on the 
ground that it represented apolitical symbol challenging the 
secular foundations of the state and therefore breaking the 
public order."22 
13 
.... ~·· ' 
In Sum considering all this mechanisms, it can he said that 
during the 1980s Islam has developed as a significant dimension 
of civil society and its revivalism was encouraged by the state 
elites. So How the theoretical framework of Islamic revivalism 
can be analized? 
14 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 
I- DIFFERENT ISLAMIC TRENDS AND THEIR LABELLINGS 
Radical Islamic politico-social movements have resulted in 
revolution in Iran and have grown into powerful forces of 
opposition in many Muslim countries and among Muslim ethnic 
groups in Western societies. This reassertion of Islam in both 
the personal and the public lives of Muslim societies is often 
deseribed as the Islamic resurgence, Islamic revivalism or 
Islamic fundamentalism.ı 
The revival in the late 1970s and early 1980s has brought 
about a noticeable increase in the emphasis on religious 
identity and practice in individual and corporate life. Islami c 
revivalism -is reflected in an increased emphasis on religious 
observances - mosque attendance, fasting during Ramadan - a new 
vitality in Sufism, the increase of religious literature, media 
programs and audiocasettes, the growth of new Islamic 
associations committed to socioreligious reform 
reassertion of Islam in Muslim politics.z 
and the 
More significantly, "many revivalist trends in the 1970-80 
period emphasized the need for greater self reliance, and a 
desire to reclaim the accomplishments of the post and root 
individual and national self identity more indigenously in an 
17 
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Islamic tradition that had once been a dominant world power and 
civilization."3 
While there are fragmented and differentiated groups and 
trends within it, the general or common framework of Islamic 
revivalism of 20th century is characterized by Esposito as 
following;4 firstly, by many trends Islam is taken as a total 
and comprehensive way of life, religion being integral to 
politics, law and society; secondly the belief that the failure 
of Islam is caused by the departure from the 'straight poth' of 
Islam and by following a Western secular path with i ts 
materialistic ideologies and values; thirdly, the renewal of 
society requires a return to Islam, drawing its inspiration from 
the Quran and from the first great Islamic movement led by the 
Muhammed; fourthly, among some Islamic movements, altough the 
westernization is condemned, science and technology are 
accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic beliefs and 
values; finally, to restore God's rule and inaugurate a true 
' Islamic social order, Western - inspired civil codes must be 
replaced by Islamic law which is the only acceptable blueprint of 
Muslim society.s 
Although there are common features of Islamic movements~ 
~ ~· they do not constitute a monolithic body: there is a 
considerable fragmentation and diversity among Islamic groups and 
trends. Therefore Islamic ideology is not homogeneous. Neither 
the acceptance of the Quran and Sunna as the basic sources, nor 
the common wish to construct an Islamic social and political 
order are sufficient to consider Muslims as having a homogeneous 
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body of principles.s 
Haddad distinquishes three categories in order to explain 
the political ideologies of the Middle Eastern Islamic groups. 
First are the Muslim 'acculturationists'; those secularists, 
socialists and nationalists, who seek to be relevant to the 
modern world and are therefore open to appropriating western 
technology. Second are the Muslim 'normativists' who evaluate 
religion as being not only the central part of life but the 
totality of life from which all of reality proceeds and has its 
meaning. The 'normativists' find the authority of the post valid 
for the present and for the future. They refuse any compramise 
with technology and on the question of identity. Although 
'acculturationists' perceive religion as being something that 
deals with the spiritual aspects of life, and as such must not 
be intricately involved in the shaping of the social order, 
'normativists' assert that Islam is a total system, constantly 
moulding and shaping all aspects of life to conform to divine 
guidance. 7 Third are the 'neonormativist' Muslims "who have 
consciously assumed the guest for an Islamic world view that is 
relevant to the modern world. In their attempt to revitalize and 
modernize their societies they are insisted that Islam must be 
the_ norm which all aspects of life are to be measured. The ir 
ultimate goal is the reconstitution of a vibrant Islamic 
society. "8 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Society 
movements are evaluated by Had d ad in this neo-normativists 
category. 
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It can be said that the crux of the differences among these 
various labelled Islamic trends is their differences over the 
understanding and use of Islamic history and tradition as well as 
the nature and the degree of change they advocate. 9 
As distinct from Haddad, Esposito has divided these Islamic 
trends into two broad categories, traditionalists and reformists 
while recognizing that such categorization is arbitray and that 
individuals and groups may overlop from one category to another. 
In the category of traditionalists there are sub-divisions; 
conservatives, neo-traditionalists (or neo-fundamentalists) and 
the sub-divisions of reformers are modernists, 
secularists. 
westernists and 
"The conservative position is presented by the majority of 
the ulama, for whom Islam is expressed quite adequately and 
_completely in the classical formulation of Islam, developed by 
the law schools during the early Islamic centuries and embodied 
and preserved in the manuals and commentaries an Islamic law."lO 
Though, for the conservatives Islam is a closed cultural system, 
fully articulated in the past, so there is little need to g~ 
back directly to the Quran and Sunna to develop new answers. The 
interpretation of Islam, they say, governed the Muslim 
community down through centuries and remains valid for today and 
for alages. 11 Therefore 'conservatives' emphasize the necessity 
of following past tradition (taqlid), the restoration of 
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traditional law to remedy for the problems of Muslim societies. 
On the other hand, neo-traditionalists, for Esposito, 
advocate a return to Islam and Sharia. They propose to go back 
to the fundamental sources of Islam in order to go back to 
contemporary needs 
movements like the 
and conditions. According to Esposito 
Islam Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i 
represent this approach. Although Westernization is rejected by 
neo-traditionalists (with its law, social institutions) 
selective modernization is not. 
According to them science and technology are cautiously 
appropriated and 'Islamized' that is, subordinated to Islamic 
values and purposes.ız 
On the other hand, for Esposito, reformers insist that 
while much of the post law and practice may be useful; new 
circumstances require new solutions. While critical of the West, 
reformers tend to be less anti-Western and polemical in their 
rhetoric and approach.ı3 
Briefly, I can say that variations among the Islamic groups 
were mainly based on their understanding and use of Islamic 
history and tradition and by their response to western culture, 
technology and industry. 
Based on Haddad and Esposito's arguments. I can say that 
Turkish intellectuals tit into the 'normativists' category in 
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Haddad's view and partially fit into the 'neotraditionalist' 
category of Esposito. 
It should be noted that the Turkish case should be regarded 
differently from other Middle Eastern countries when evaluating 
the characteristics of Turkish Islamic movements. There are 
reasons for this. First of all, the westernization and 
modernization processes in Ottoman - Turkish Islamic context was 
based on choices and preferences of a native reformers in the 
Ottoman empire and not due to colonization. Rather, since the 
18th Century 'westernization' and 'modernization' attempts have 
existed as a preference of Ottoman Empire. Turkey was never 
colonized as other countries of the Middle East. Secondly, the 
theme of Islam did not represent the ideology of independence war 
as in other Muslim societies. Thirdly and importantly, in the 
Ottoman Empire there was a differentiation of popular Islam and 
-official Islam as the one dimension of the center-periphery 
cleavage,l4 "At the center it appeared as a scripturalist, 
Sharia-minded, ulama governed orthodoxy: at the social 
periphery as a primordially embedded heterodoxy permeated by 
'sects', 'religious orders' (tarikats), 
p 
'saints' (Şeyh) with 
supernatural powers, and as lotiduanism to today, s ome 
'mysticism' (tasavvuf)."lS With regards to today, some orders 
(tarikats) have taken their legitimacy from the extension of old 
orders and sects of the Ottoman time.ıs 
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The fourth important differentiation point of Turkey from 
other Muslim countries is the state tradition in Turkish context. 
According to Heper. "Islam enjoined the unity of the State and 
Muslim community. Religion and the state were considered one and 
the some entity."I 7 However, in the Ottoman-Turkish context, 
as Heper has indicated, the state was distinctly saperated from 
society." The state model in that polity essentially came from 
the military: in fact the members of the military established 
the state ... The Ottoman sultans could easily issue laws and 
regulations which did not derive from Islamic precedents."lB 
Heper also talks about the 'adab' tradition in the Ottoman 
context that was the state oriented tradition. For Heper, "the 
idea of a state power independent of religion never lost its 
salience in Ottoman-Turkish context."19 
In the scope of my thesis I will not deal any further with 
the varying characteristics of Turkish and Middle Eastern Muslim 
societies. However, in the future project this differences can 
be used as an analytical tool to make a comparison among Islamic 
society of Turkish context and other Muslim countries. 
Additionally, I will divide the Islamic groups into three 
categories, considering their respanses to West and modernism. 
The first group is the modernists who are proposing the 
acceptance 
technology, 
--
of westernization both with its culture and 
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The second group are mainly 'traditionalists' who have a 
strong sense of resistance to the cultural side of westernization 
but have a positive outlock to modern technology: They accept 
' 
the technology and industry of the west but reject the adaptation 
of its culture. Moreover traditionalists give attention not only 
to the Quran and Sunna but the lived traditions and experiences 
through the history of Islam. 
The third group are the fundamentalists who reject the west 
and modernism totally, both its culture and technology. They 
propose a reinterpretation of the Quran and Sunna to rebuild 
Islam as a distinct and integrated system. The fundamentalists 
give attention to the written word of the Quran rather than to 
traditional practices and spiritual leaders. Many of the Islamic 
intellectuals of 1980 period can be taken as the representatives 
of this group. Ali Bulaç, the subject of this thesis, is the 
representator of this group. 
Up to this point I have tried to evaluate the different 
versions of Islamic trends and movements. The crux of their 
H 
differences lies in variations related to their response to the 
West and modernism. So in the second part of this chapter, 
within Turkish context, I will try to analyse the possible 
reasons of Islamic revivalism and the rise of Islami c 
intellectuals, asking in what ways the west and modernism have 
been refulted. 
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II- MODERNIZATION ATTEMPTS AND ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: 
Radical Islamic politico-social movements have been powerful 
forces of opposition in many Muslim countries and among the 
Muslim ethnic groups of Western societies. 
By the term Muslim country I mainly mean countries in which 
the majority of population is Muslim (whether Shi'a or Sunni), 
without taking into consideration the nature of their regimes. 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Libya have the highest 
density of Muslim population among Middle - Eastern countries. 
Sudan has the lowest. (Saudi Arabia 100%, Turkey 99%, Iran 
98%, Iraq 97%, Libya 97%, Egypt 90%, Jordon 92%, Syria 86% 
and Sudan 73%)20 
In the last decade Islamic revivalism has occurred in many 
Muslim countries as an opposing ideology to industrialization, 
Westernization and modernism, generally in terms of technology, 
industry and culture. It can be said that Islamic movements were 
not content to resist the industrialization process. Furthermore 
many of them have emphasized problems related to socio-cultural 
values, norms and human relations. Some of the fundamentalists 
are demanding a pure Islamic society in which every sphere will 
be regulated by Islamic principles.ıı 
This phenomenon is full of puzzles for the secular approach 
which regards religion as an ideology that belongs to the pre-
capitalist period. According to this view, with the development 
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of capitalist relations and the rise of technology, industry and 
science in daily life, religious ideology and its socio-cultural 
sanctions should become ineffective.22 
On the other hand, the debate about Islamic revivalism has 
suggested that if the desires of Islamic countries to 
Industrialize and catch up with western countries since the 
second half of the 19th century had been succesful, Islami c 
ideology would not have reached its present degree of intensity23 
as the Turkish example shows. 
The origin of the modernization of Turkish society lies in 
its Ottoman past but within the limits of this thesis it is 
sufficient to start with the republican period. 
The Kemalist regime initiated revolutionary projects aiming 
at creating a new Turkish society that would eventually reach the 
level of the tcivilized nations'. The main aim of the Kemalist 
cadres, while structuring the cultural revolution with new value 
systems, was to replace the functions of religion at the socio-
cultural and political levels with a new ideology. "The Turkish 
revolution was in essence a cultural revolution which radically 
change d the Islamic legitimizing system and replaced it with a 
>"' 
secular, nationalist republic."24 In other words, 
!IP. 
it was aimed 
at replace religion as a means of social identity and source of 
political ideology by a secular political ideology.zs 
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The issue of religion became politicized in Turkey following 
the secular reforms of the early republican era. "Positivism 
replaced faith as the dominant, indeed the official outlock with 
the secular discourse of the Kemalist elite denying any 
legitimacy to Islam in public life. The process of 
Westernization not only in terms of institutions but also interms 
of cultural identity - was in no other Muslim country, as 
radical."26 
The Kemalist outlock supported the ideology 
Islam and used its power to destroy 
of 
the westernization against 
symbols of the later,27 However, it did not succeeded totally 
in becoming a rival ideology to religious. 
According 
weaknesses o( 
to Mardin, 
Kemal i sm. 
this resulted from 
The first was. "the 
two major 
inability of 
Atatürk's educational attempts to reach the rural masses, 
leaving a blank in their understanding of social reality, which 
became critica! as social change mobilized large numbers of them. 
Kemalism neither had an extensive explanation of how social 
justice was to be achieved nor did it provide a more general 
ethical underpinning of society by drawing its social principles 
out of a credible ideology. The republic created this ethical 
vacumn in a society where religious and ethical command had been 
important. The inability of Kemalism to provide a social ethos 
that appealed to the hearths as well as to the mind was more 
27 
. -
disorienting than would appear at first sight."28 So the 
replacement of religion (Islam) by the secular worldview of 
Kemalism caused same emptiness and puzzles at the level of 
individuals in terms of their daily life. By the revolution of 
Republican period, even daily rituals such as marriage 
ceremonies, death, birth, ete. were taking new forms. 
According to Mardin, in the countryside this emptiness was 
filled by forms of folk Islam,29 
According to Mardin, the second weakness of Kemalism was 
that; Kemalism would not permit the existence of ideologies that 
would be a rival to it,30 For Mardin, if the ideology of 
private enterprise had been allawed to develop by itself, it 
could have penetrated fomilial relationships and replaced the 
function of religion and become the strict ideology at least for 
one strata of society. From his point of view this bourgeois 
' > 
·ideology with its attention to individualism could be the riva! 
for Islam based on an 'ummah' (community) outlook,31 
However, Islamic revivalism in Turkey can not be explained 
only by the weaknesses of Kemalism. The whole process oft 
t• 
'modernization' and its effects should be taken into account to 
suggest a remarkable analysis. 
'Modernization' as a histerical concept includes such 
specific aspects of change as industrialization of the economy or 
secularization of ideas, but it is not limited to these. It 
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involves a marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a 
spread of secular, scientific and technical educati'on, a 
transition from ascribed to achived status, an increase in 
material standards of living, 
phenomena.32 
and many related and subsidiary 
As understood by above mentioned quotation, modernization 
can be deseribed as the transition from pre-industrial to 
industrial society or in söciological concepts, a shift from 
gemeinschaft to gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft refers to a community 
which consists of face-to-face relationships with known persons, 
many of who m are related through blood or marriage. 
Gemeinschaftlich relationships were intimate, enduring and based 
upon a clear understanding of each individuals" position in 
society. The re was also very little mobility, either 
l•..__ 
geographically or socially. 
refers to the large scale, 
\ 
contractual relationships.33 
On the other side gesellschaft 
impersonal, calculative and 
In gesellschaft the re. are 
organizations-, associations and arrangements which are based on 
. - -'.~· 
formal institutions, legal statuses, contracts, legal 
fictions; it is not morally given but is subject to revision, 
revocation or transition.34 
Gemenschaft is experienced as enduring and constraining 
while society as gesellschaft which has a more or less temporary 
and provisional dimension, is experiencedas 'constructed'.35 
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If we are saying that modernization can be deseribed as the 
shift from gerneinschaft to gesellschaft we can also say that 
this shift or transition means the society which is based on 
structure is replaced by one which is based on culture. "In 
modern society roles and positions are not well defined and 
stable therefore not as crucial as they used to be in traditional 
society. As a consequence, the relative importance of culture 
(and ideology) has increased."36 
In such a socia~ setting a personal identity is defined more 
in terms of culture than structure; this brings to modern 
society 
society, 
chosen. 
a feeling of 'consttructedness'.37 In traditional 
the identity of the individual is given rather than 
The status of the individual is determined by his/her 
blood ties. However, in modern society personal identity is 
given by culture. The identity of individuals depends on not 
"who are they?" but on "what are they doing". Sqı in such a 
. 
society culture is mor e remarkable than structure in the 
determination of an individuals' identities. "A feeling of 
constructedness which takes place as a result of the transition 
from a society based on structure to one based on culture 
increased in modern society."38 
h~ 
In Turkey rapid urbanization has continued since the 1950s. 
This represented a shift from society as gemeinschaft to 
gesellschaft. Rapid social change has eroded ~he tradational 
bonds and tie which in the short run could not be replaced with 
30 .... 
new-ones. With urbanization and im-migration from country to big 
cities, traditional bonds were carried to the cities. But what 
is lived there, by many of migrants, is neither the traditional 
life nor the modern one. The slum areas of big cities are the 
places that the tradition of gemeinschaft is stronger than the 
culture of gesellschaft. Through rural-urban migration many 
people in Turkey are efaced with the culture of gesellschaft 
although they have traditional bonds. "In particular young 
people who moved from provincial or metropolitan areas and 
acquired some higher education increasingly found themselves in a 
constructed social environment that had less definite normative 
foundations than they were accustomed to. In centrast to their 
experience of a given personal identity in a morall community, 
they were faced with choosing who to be, with whom to associate, 
what to think, even with choosing how to dress, what to eat; 
all matters that were more orless socially given in Anatelian 
.:ıı- ~-
villages and·t~wns."39 
So, ~he ideologization of experience is lived by these 
young people w~thin the cities. They were faced with the truth 
,~- ...... 
of finding f~~ themselves a new form of personal identity,40 
The modernization process has changed the social structure 
of .ıslamic societies. It has abolished traditional structures 
and values which it has not been totally successful in replacing. 
The modernization process and its relative failure has resulted 
in both economic and social deprivation. Economic deprivation 
has resulted in the failure to satisfy material expectations. 
Social deprivation, on the other hand, has caused uncertainty 
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of aims, ambivalence of behaviour criteria and the growth of 
conflictual expectations and feelings. 41 This social deprivation 
mostly can be observed among young people moving from rural to 
metropolitan areas and, acquiring some higher education, 
increasingly finding themselves in a constructed social 
environment in where there were less definite normative 
foundations than those they were accustomed to. Their experience 
than those they were accustomed to. Their experience of society 
as gesellschaft brings with it a sense that identities and 
relationships are artificial and obstract and hence meaningless 
and inconsequential.42 
On the other side, it should be kept in mind that the major 
aim of ideologies being to supply identity and moral satisfaction 
to their supporters. Islamic ideology can enable individuals to 
express themselves and it supplies them with a sense that they 
are a part of the whole, which results in a moral 
satisfaction.43 
~. 
Islam, in general, is a holistic religion. It determines 
every sphere of life. It is both a normative system and a 
political ideology. 44 From the private life to jorisprundence, 
political and economic spheres, it has regulations. So it hJf' 
two ideological frameworks. At the individual level it gives 
meaning to life and in the political arena it regulates the 
collective life and gives legality to politics.45 
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This two-dimensional ideological function of Islam 
(especially normative Islam) is related to its structure 
depending on an "ümmet" (community) base which has a very 
significant to rise the morale of the masses. 
The sufi brotherhoods (tarikats) can also give moral 
satisfaction to their members. In the post 1980s era the 
increased number of tarikats have drawn attention. According to 
Şaylan "Rapid urbanization, industrialization and mass rural-
urban migration between 1950-80 in Turkey created widespread 
rootlessness, anomie, enstrongement and identity erises which 
created grounds for the reemergence of repressed orders (such as 
Nakşibendilik, Kadirilik, ete. ) , the reconstitution of neo-
orders (such as Nurculuk, Süleymancılık) and the proliferation 
of supra order groups around some journals". 46 
In Sum, .-: the strains and conflicts of modernisation policies 
............ ~ ... 
in Turkey has caused a sense of deprivation and identity crises. 
Because of the insufficiency of counter-religious ideologies to 
1 
solve their P!Oblems, Islam has appeared as an alternative for 
people to solve their problems.47 
Briefly, I can say that the revivalism of Islam in the 
Turkish context can not be explained only by one reason. The re 
is a conjuction of many incidents in this process. The 
weaknesses of Kemalism, rapid urbanization movements, identity 
crises, insufficiency of counter religious ideologies, the 
influence of the Iranian revolution, 
33 
the policies of state 
Biliçen t U ;:ı: versit, 
Li~:-::: 1 
elites and socio-economic problems of individuals can be taken as 
some parameters of Islamic revivalism. 
III- THE RISE OF ISLAMIC INTELLECTUALS; 
In Turkey a new phenomenon occured in the 1980s. This is 
the rise of an Islamic intelligentsia. Compared with earlier 
Islamic intellectuals, contemporary Islamic thinkers show marked 
differences in the language of their discourse, which is no 
longer formulated in terms of a conflict between the Islamic 
conception of society and the nature of the modern technocratic -
industrial civilization.48 
Many Islamic intellectuals reject the constructedness of 
social identity and relationships. "For the Muslim 
intellectuals, Islam is a social discourse which represents an 
alternative to the Western and secular gesellschaft of 
i 
.contemporary Turkey, one which would be free of the emptiness 
~ 
and justice that they attribute to modern society."49 
Furthermore, Islamist thinkers who rose through the 1980s 
in Turkey are the products of a secular education, so the)5. 
discourses reflect the logical sequence of secular thought based 
on reason and a syatematic presentation of ideas.so 
By many of these Islamic intellectuals Western culture is 
criticized because of its role on the deprivation of traditional 
values and norms: what is taken as traditional values are ~ot 
Turkish customs but real Islamic values. 
..-
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In general, Islamic society is perceived by many of these 
Islamic intellectuals as an alternative to modernity. But their 
use of Islam as an alternative to modernism does not refer to 
traditional beliefs and practices in the Turkish context; rather 
they imply an Islam which was never perfectly realized in Turkey, 
one that is based on divine revelation and orthodox practice, 
not on post customary practices in the Ottoman or any other 
Islamic empire.sı 
This huge attention to this conflictual situation arises 
from the arguments about the social setting. The conception of 
social setting is important to these Islamic thinkers because 
according to them the Islamic assumption of mankind is one of 
being servants of Allah to actualize his system on earth. 5 2 In 
this schem~ aociety is a mean by which this ~nd is reached. In 
,_.. . .... 
. - ·• .... ~ 
their arguments, therefore, the standing of society is crucial 
for reaching the ideal Islamic society. In general, for many of 
\ 
them the desire to revitalize the Golden Age of Islam and 
eliminate deviations is paramount . The force of elimination is 
.... ;. 
formulated as modernism, furthermore, many Islamists believe 
that Westernization trends in Muslim countries are highly 
effective in decaying the indigenous cultures. 
Following this theoretical framework, in the next chapter I 
will try to evaluate the writings of one of the Islamic 
intellectual, Ali Bulaç, a significant member of the Islamic 
35 
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j 
fundamentalist 
rejection of 
movement of 1980 era. 
'constructedness' of 
His writings reflect the 
modern society. Bulaç 
criticizes modernism and westernism projects and he proposes a 
pure Isla~ic society that takes its legitimacy from the Quran and 
the Sunna. 
... 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ONE OF THE TURKISH ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL: ALİ BULAÇ 
I- BIOGRAPHY OF BULAÇ; 
Ali Bulaç was born in 1951 in Mardin where he attended 
primary and secondary school. Then he moved to Istanbul where he 
graduated from the Istanbul higher Islamic institute in 1975. 
Among the many Islamic thinkers, Ali Bulaç is distinguished by 
having had an Islamic and a secular education. After his 
graduation from the Islamic and a secular, he attended the 
Sociology Department of the Faculty of Art and Science at 
Istanbul University. I think that Bulaç's importance in the 
Islamic fundamentalist movement of the 1980s in large part has 
be en ca us ed by his sociology background: in his writings and 
discussions he mak es general use of sociological concepts and 
analytical tools. 
' .
From the middle of the 1970s Bul aç has be en active as a 
writer and editor in connection with different journals, 
newspapers and publishing houses. In 1976, the journal of 
'Düşünce' and at 1984 the 'insan' publishing house 
established by him. In 1987 he helped to publish the journal 
'Zaman'. He has published articles in various magazines such as 
'Hareket', 'Düşünce', 'ilim ve Sanat', 'Girişim' and has writen 
columns in various newspapers, including 'Yeni Devir', 'Milli 
Gazete' and 'Zaman'. 
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.Additionally, in 1983 he won the prize of 'Fikir' by the 
association of Turkish writers Nowadays, 
of 'Kitap' and 'Endülüs' publishing houses. 
Bulaç is the director 
His published books include; The Turkish Meaning of the 
Quran (third edition, ı 990); The Ideas on Quran and Sunna 
(third edition, 1985); Intellectual Issues in the Islamic World 
(second edition, 1985); Social Change in the Islamic World 
(second edition, 1991); Concepts and Orders of Our Time (first 
edition 1976 and eleventh edition in 1991); Religion and 
Modernism (first edition, 1990); The Reality of the Middle East 
(first edition, 1988). 
Beyand these books, he is a regular columnist in the 
'Kitap' magazine. Also in May and June 1992, his debates with 
some lefti~t; :";_ wri ters were published in 'Bir~ikim' , the monthly 
socialist-cultural periodical. 
II- ALİ BULAÇ~s THOUGHT; 
Bulaç's importance arises from his popularity and appeal to 
Islamic youth, many of them university and high school students. 
Although he knows Arabic and is familiar with the classical 
Islamic sources, his books and articles are quite different from 
writings of the tarikat Şeyhs and other leaders of fundamentalist 
flourishes from classical Islamic sources. Bulaç writes in a 
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form that represents a system of secular thought, within the 
boundaries of scientific methods, using footnotes, citing 
references, statistical summaries ete. 
With his university education in the sociology department, 
this secular discourse has equipped him well with the knowledge 
of foreign languages, western social and political thought and 
contemporary critica! thinking in the West.ı Also, with his 
sociological background, he knows the West well and this 
knowledge resounds through the themas advanced in his critiques 
of Western capitalism and consumer society. 
I think all of these factors are relevant to his popularity 
and the wide reading of his books. The newly emerging Islamic 
youth is composed not only of theological school students, but 
mainly university educated people. The popularity of Islamic 
publications amongst the majority of university -educated Islamic 
youth is an important phenomenon of Turkish context.' 
Although in his books the main thema is the critique of 
modernism, many other issues are taken into account by him. In 
his latest book, "Religion and Modernism'', he argues about all p 
ı• 
the issues that have taken the attention of public opinion in the 
1980s and the early 1990s, such as homosexuality, lesbianism, 
feminism, post-modernism, environmental problems, atheism, 
problems of consumer society and communication systems. He is 
very critica! of modern society; for him the only solution for 
te psychological and cultural well-being of individuals is the 
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pure Islamic society resting on the implementation of the Quran 
and Sunna. 
From this point of view, first of all I will try to 
evaluate his writings in terms of the rejection of 
'constructedness'. Almost all of his books and writings in 
periodicals reflect the rejection of constructedness by which is 
meant an identity which is chosen rather than given. 3 
From this perspective initially I am going to try to 
evaluate Bulaç's views on modernism and westernism. 
A) BULAÇ's UNDERSTANDING OF MODERNISM AND WESTERNISM 
In almost all of his writings Ali Bulaç emphasizes the 
cultural decay of third world countries and especially the Muslim 
world following the application of .Westernization and 
modernization. He mostly deals with the cultural side of 
westernization, 
Islamic values. 
which he interests as an assqult on traditional 
According to Bulaç, modernization and westernization to a 
degree refer to the same thing. Westernization was mostly used 
durJng the 'second half of the 19th century and the early 20th 
century. But this concept, after the 1960s, was replaced by 
modernization which is mostly used by western sientists, 
politicians, as well as third world politicians and scientists. 
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For Bulaç modernization is the newest dimension of western 
imperialism and colonialism.4 Western countries desire to reduce 
the world to one mosaic culture in order to be hegemonic. 5 In 
order to ,reach this desire the consumption patterns, life styles 
and life expectations of the west, are exported to the third 
world and Muslim world in the name of modernization. This 
process requires dependency and the 'underdeveloped' positions of 
third world countries will never end since terms such as 
undeveloped, developing or third world country are imposed by 
the W e st to maintain this dependency and exploitation. 
Furthermore, for Bulaç, the term modernism is related to the 
level of culture and human conssiousness. The dependency on 
Western countries is not in essence technological, industrial or 
political but exists mainly at the level of culture and 
consiousness.s For Bulaç, modernism keeps us far from our own 
consumpiton patterns, daily ceremonies and values~ So culture 
takes the most harmful blow in this process. 
In other words, for Bulaç modernization is a kind of 
ideology produced by western scholars and politicians in order to 
p 
impose their technology, industry and in essence their cultu~e 
on countries that are not western. Bulaç, evaluates modernism 
mostly in terms of its cultural imposition and its destructive 
effects on the indigenous cultures and moral structures of non-
western /Muslim countries. 
. -
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Moreover, in Bulaç's· view, modernism is based on the 
positivist and nationalist principles that are opposed to 
religious knowledge, which is acquired with the relevation of 
God. 
I think that Bulaç's critism starts with the rejection of 
individualism andthe worldly orientation of modernism. For him 
modernism elevates the individual against the God, reJects the 
divine revelation and causes man to worship technology and 
industry. 
Bul aç rejects modern i sm totally in i ts cultural, 
technological and industrial aspects. The culture of modernism 
is based on a desire for endless consumption that is opposed to 
the divine rule of controlling inordinate appetites tnefs' in 
order to resist worldly materialism. Bulaç rejects technology 
' 
and industry due to their effect on the destruction of community 
relationships and because they feed the consumptionist spirit. 
Insted of using technological and industrial commodities, he 
proposes the methods of old centuries that has not been shaped by 
technological innovations, to the daily needs. 
Moreover, the high degree of division of labour and 
specialization in industry is criticized by Bulaç due to the 
isolation and atomization of individuals in this process. 
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According to Bulaç, modernism and westernism are two sides 
of the same coin. Bulaç are imposed by Western countries on non-
Western in the name of development and industrialization. 
Furthermore, he adds 'imperialism' to the framework of 
Westernism and modernism as a derivative of these ideologies. He 
gives attention to the cultural side of imperialism rather than 
its economic character and stresses its opposition to divinity 
and hegemony of God in the universe. Bulaç thinks about 
imperialism not as the highest stage of capitalism as Lenin did, 
but evaluates it as the feature of both capitalism and socialist 
systems. At the heart of imperialism lies exploitation and 
domination. The relatively developed countries have dominated 
the underdeveloped ones in the name of development. But for 
Bulaç this is opposed to Islamic thinking in which the only 
demination and sovereignty belongs to God. Imperialism is one 
derivation of modernism which requires the superiority of some 
countries over the others in terms of technological and 
industrial development. 
Briefly I can say that Bulaç is against modernism in all its 
aspects. The evolutionary, progressive, individualistic,~ 
~ 
rational and materialistic features of modernism are all highly 
criticized by him . Although he is against the technological and 
industrial sides of modernism, he gives most of his attention to 
its destructive effects on the indigenous cultures of Muslim 
countries. 
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Bulaç's rejection and criticism of modernism close to the 
definition of modernisation by Wilbert Moore as "a total 
transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the 
types of technology and associated social politically stable 
nations of the Western world". 7 What Bulaç criticizes is, this 
evolutionary pattern of modernism, taking the West as the 
. 
tmodal' and imitating it slavishly. 
In the justification of his views and arguments, in some 
cases Bulaç borrows the concepts and perspective of dependency 
school arguments. Dependency-school is a variation of Marxist 
thought, arising in the Iate 1960s in response to the theories 
of the modernisation school. Modernisation school theorists talk 
about stages of growth and seek the cause of underdevelopment 
within the internal factors of countries. They also assume that 
development follows essentially the same pattern in all 
societies.s 
These features common to all modernisation theories arise 
from the combination of evolutionism functionalism and 
positivism. These features are summed of by Tony Barnett as 
follows: "Development takes place from within a society 
external events such as colonialism and cultural influences are 
not particularly important; development follows essentially the 
same pattern in all societies; the end result of development is 
prosperity and relative political stability; the scientific 
study of history and society will enable us to identify patterns 
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from the past experience of some countries, such as the United 
States and Britain and use this knowledge to bring about the same 
results in the developing or undeveloped ones". 9 
On the other hand the dependency school argument begin with 
the assertian that underdevelopment is not a stage which precedes 
development, rather it is the end result of imperialism and 
colonialism. According to dependency theorists, the development 
of part of the world arised because of exploitation by the 
developed countries. Both, however "were only parts of a single 
social system in which the colonized and now the neo-colonial 
countries- the periphery- were not simply 'underdeveloped', but 
had been underdeveloped by other countries which together 
constituted the centre of this world system'. 1 0 According to 
Andre Gunter Frank, an influential represeptative of the 
dependency school, the only significant development in Latin 
America occured whenever the power of the West was temporarily 
interrupted, notably during the depression of the 1930s and 
during the second world war. However for him there could be no 
permanent development in the periphery until the strangehold of 
the centre was broken.ıı 
p 
The only aspect of dependency theory which Bulaç agrees with 
is his view that the underdeveloped position of the non-Western 
countries is caused by Western ones in order to exploit and 
dominate them. Additionally, according to Bulaç, with 
modernisation and westernization policies the world has been 
divided into two main classes, the exploiters and exploiteds; 
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the exploiters are the western countries and those exploited are 
rest of the world. 
However, as distinct the dependency school, Bulaç has 
given more attention to the 'cultural' exploitation of non-
Western countries than the econimic. Moreover, dependency 
school has questionized the possible ways of industrialization 
and development of third world countries, i.e. 
wherees Bulaç strongly rejet technological 
in Latin America 
and industrial 
development altogether. Bulaç's desire is not a developed, 
industrialized society but a pure Islamic society that will give 
the immaterial and spiritual satisfaction to its people. 
In sum, I can say that, although in some cases Bulaç 
borrows the concepts and phrases of dependency theory and Marxist 
tradition, i.e. alienation, exploitatio~ class struggle, in 
essence he is against the materialism of these schools. In some 
cases he has written as the loyal Dependency school theorist 
especially in the discussion of the exploitation of third world 
countries by the Western ones. However, 
world view differentiates him from 
Additionally Bulaç criticizes Marxism 
his anti-materialistic, 
this Marxist tradition. 
in his writings and 
evaluates it within the 'modern systems' that take their base not 
from the knowledge of divine message, but from worldly views. 
The only intersecion among Bulaç's view and dependency school 
has in the criticism and in some degree rejection of 
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modernisation theories and Western policies by both of them, due 
to their role in the exploitation of non-Western countries. 
Henceforth, the evaluation and progressive worldview of 
modernisation and than modernizm as an ideology are rejected and 
criticized by Bulaç due to their antithethical character to the 
Islamist world view, which is not evolutionary. Islam is a 
universal religion, standing above histerical conditions, time 
and space. It is divinely given and immutable. For him only 
Islam, standing outside history, is eternal and divinely given 
so for him all of western social systems and Christianity can not 
solve the cosmological, spiritual and existential mystery. In 
these western social systems, either in capitalism or in 
socialism, the identity erisis of individuals is not resolved. 
Only Islam can solve cosmological, spiritual and existential 
problems of individuals and only it can solve the identity 
crisis.1 2 
According to Bulaç, big cities are centers of modernism and 
they were constructed for this purpose by the Westernist 
politicians and governors of third world countries. 13 Their main 
p 
aim was the transformatian of traditions and the imposition dt 
modern values and norms. For Bulaç, the arabesque culture 
existed in the big cities where tradition and modern life style 
have intersected. For Bulaç, the Islamic revival of exists 
between the arabesque culture and the modernism of official 
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societr. The difference of this new phenomenon from the 
arabesque culture is its manner versus modernity and tradition. 
So for Bulaç, this is the fundamental character of Islamic 
revivalism in the 1980s. 
According to Bulaç this Islamic revivalism has found its 
voice mainly in cities because they are concentrated spaces where 
individuals are alienated because of the rational and absolute 
functional identity of cities.ı4 Therefore Bulaç criticizes the 
constructedness of modern society due to individuals becoming 
atomized and losing their community ties and identities in modern 
big cities. 
At this point I can say that Bulaç criticizes city life due 
to its role in the atomization of persons and the destruction of 
community feeling. In Bulaç's view the perfect society is based 
' 
not atomized and isolated from each other. (So Bulaç criticizes 
the constructedness of modern city life because its induces on 
identity erises in individuals and destroys the feeling of 
community.) 
According to Bulaç, in order to break the hallmarks of 
modernism and to escape its destructive outcomes the only way at 
the individual level is to turn to God and at the societal level, 
to apply the divine order with the guidance of Quran and Sunna.ıs 
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B) FORMAL AND CIVIL ISLAM; 
Bulaç discusses four main trends in Muslim societies. The 
first trend is mainly defended by laic fundamentalists. Bul aç 
include Atatürk in this trend. The second is the modernization 
of Islam. This policy is mainly directed by formal State 
institutions, such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 
Turkey. The third is the Islamizatian of modernity. Bulaç has 
included the Fazlur Ralıman and religious organizations (tarikats) 
in this trend. The last is the rejection of modernity by Islam, 
a view which suggests a rupture from traditional Islam as well as 
the modern world. 
After this formulation Bulaç talks about two ways of the 
Islamizatian process. These are from top down and the reverse 
one; from bottom up. The first is called political Islam by 
some writers and the latter as cultural Islam. Bulaç uses the 
phrase formal Islam to refer to political Islam and civil Islam 
to cultural Islam.ı6 
According to Bulaç's point of view, formal Islam 
Tanzimat tradition resting on the political power at the 
is the 
}7-
centfe 
and expressed through state policy. In formal Islam, change and 
Islamizatian process is realized through political power in the 
state mechanisms. For Bulaç, in formal Islam the Islamizatian 
process can be controlled from above. 
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On 
society. 
state. 
the other hand, civil Islam takes its legitimacy from 
In civil Islam the 'ummah' is more important than the 
The cultural and social side is predominant over 
political 
Islam the 
and military power in the civil Islam,17 In civil 
islamizatian process is realized by mavement s from 
below; the peripheral forces are more crucial than the centre. 
According to Bulaç, up to the middle Abbas period civil Islam 
was realized, ensuring the continuity of Islam for centuries.ıs 
Bulaç puts the Refah (Prosperity) Party in Turkey within the 
category of formal Islam and criticizes the projects and promises 
of RP concerning industrialization and development of Turkey. 
Because of its desire for development it is accustomed to 
modernism. However in civil Islam, the force behind the 
islamizatian process is based on human and social dynamics. 
Civil Islam-appears alongside the universal 'ummah' idea versus 
the homogenous- universal state of modernism. 
In Bulaç's view, civil Islam represents the idea that 
proposes an epistemological rupture from the modern West and 
change of directian towards the Quran and Sunna as the main 
sources of a pure Islamic society. So civil Islam, for Bulaç is 
the answer to the expectations and problems of the Muslim world. 
Bulaç is the defender of civil Islam or cultural Islam in 
Göle's term. 19 Bulaç mostly deals with the cultural side of the 
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transformatian of Islamic identity. The transformatian within 
the individuals' inner world is more crucial in the islamizatian 
process than political actions. The transformatian of and 
concsiousness at individual and social-cultural levels is more 
important for Bulaç than the political organization to reach the 
desired end of an Islamic society. To reach the pure Islamic 
society the transformatian should be realized at the level of 
consciousness. Bulaç thinks that politicization causes an 
impowerishment of Islam and questions the tensions between Islam 
and politics, tradition and modernism, religion and the 
worldly, belief and rationalist positivism in a new dynamic that 
presents the opposition of Islam and West.2° 
I think Bulaç's concentration on the identity erisis and 
ambivalance of desires and expectations in city life can also be 
connected with his views of civil Islam. From his early writings 
it can be suggested that Bulaç is also a supporter of civil 
society. By political society he means the state, political 
institutions, governments that have political power and 
intellectuals who used modernism as the official ideology. On 
the other side by civil society, he means large masses or peop~~ 
v• 
who have migrated from rural areas and have a tendeney to accept 
Islamic thought.21 
In the realising of Islamic society Bulaç defends the 
Islamizatian process evolving from below to above. He is against 
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the · political party struggle method, modernism and i ts 
destructive impositions can not be passed over. So Bulaç's 
rhetoric is full of civil societal elements that will be the 
source of Islamizatian process and the legitimacy of pure Islamic 
society • 
. 
C) THE REJECTION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
The question of science and technology occupies a central 
position in Bulaç's discourse. Modern mentality, according to 
Bulaç, is supported by two main paradigms. The first is the 
belief that science is continously developing. The second is the 
belief of progress of technology in a linear way. Science and 
technology ar~ dependent on each other and abstract processes. 23 
~-
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According to Bulaç, the feeling of progress arises from the 
individual's ~nner sense. These are the desire to attain 
\ 
spiritual ~erfection and have a sense of 'certainty' ('yakın 
olmak' and 'kemale ermek'). But with modern science this sense 
·. "":\' 
of the individual cannot be satisfied. The development of 
science and technology in the West is now questioned by Bulaç in 
terms of the very validity of the principles on which Western 
science is based.24 Also, Bulaç criticizes modern science, 
centrasting the secular outlook in science as developed in the 
West with the Renaissance and the enlightenment with the Islamic 
concept of "Vahy" (God's revelation to Prophet Muhammed). 25 
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The other reason for Bulaç's criticism of modern science is 
based on his view that a universities help the state to control 
society and individuals. The modern state controls individuals 
by using science and scientific knowledge.2 6 
Secular and profane modern Western thought has changed the 
world separating the universe from divine truth and causing a 
worship of science. Furthermore, Bulaç criticizes science, 
asserting that science in the modern world serves as a new 
idol. 27 Just as primitive men worshipped the moon and the sun, 
modern men in the Western countries worship the science. 
However, for Bulaç, knowledge should originate from revelation 
of God which is written down in the Quran and the Sunna. The 
duty of every Muslim is to understand what it means to be a 
Muslim and accept his subjection to God. 28 
On the other hand, Bulaç has given special irnportance to 
the intellectual search to reach consistent and well-off society. 
According to him, in today's Islarnic societies, two groups of 
intellectuals have ernerged. On the one hand there are 
westernized intellectuals who have been alienated from the 
history, culture and the people of their country. 
.. ~ 
~~: 
They hav~e 
merely imitated the western pholosophy and science, thus failing 
to produce original works.29 
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On the other hand, the Islamist intellectuals have accepted 
history and tradition without questioning and have failed to 
produce new views, causing the poverty of Islamic thought.30 
Bul aç 
according 
gives great attention to intellectuals because 
to him, in the future intellectuals will be 
administrators who will deal with government issues and will also 
enlighten the Muslim peoples. So the most important goal for 
Islamist thinkers of the new generatian is to eliminate Western 
influences on intellectual life and to replace them with the 
Quran and the Sunna. Because they have the responsibility to act 
as the carriers of a cultural transformatian which will lead to 
internelization of the Islamic world view by the masses.31 
As well as the criticism of science, in Bulaç's writing 
there is a critique of technology and industrial growth. Bulaç 
has criticized technology and industry from two points of view. 
Firstly, he sees technology as the major cause of modern men 
withdrawing from religion and secondly, techology is found 
responsible for the destruction in modern societies. 
According to Bulaç, techonology, whereever it has existed 
and penetrated social dynamics, demolishes local cultures and 
imposes Western values. Also high technology and industry has 
caused an increase of consumption spirit. For him, people in 
western countrics live for consumption. There is no meaning of 
life and unconsiusness covers all actions of individuals.32 
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Therefore, for Bulaç, the duty of the Muslim is to reject 
any formula for the advance of technology and industry. Both 
technology and industry are imposed as desirable foods on the 
non- Western world through the imperialism of the West. For 
Bulaç, this process has caused the economic exploitation of 
natural resources and the cultural exploitation of natural 
resources and the cultural exploitation of non-Western peoples.JJ 
Furthermore, for Bulaç, technology and industry have led the 
Western countries themselves into a spiritual crisis. He says 
that the marginal groups of Western countries are aware of this 
spiritual erisis and the impact of a technological and industrial 
age on human happiness.34 
D) WHY DOES BULAÇ CRITICIZE THE CAPITALISM, FASCISM AND 
SOCIAL! SM? 
In his writings Bulaç criticizes and rejects Capitalism, 
fascism and Socialism due to the fact that they are not based on 
divine orders and depend on worldly explanations. 
According to Bulaç, it is God's unity (Tevhid) which bring~ 
~· 
the goodness, !• . maturity and peace between nature and self 
existence. Islam recognizes God's unity. Monotheism means the 
oneness of God and the power of God to create all the universe 
human and natural life. God determines definitely all universe, 
only god's unity and revelation can express the rules of the 
universe. 
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Capitalism, fascism and socialism are all in essence based 
on polytheism. The universe and rules of human nature are 
explained not through God's unity and creating power, but by 
worldly ex~lanations. 
Additionally for Bulaç, in Islam there is a consciousness 
of being a worshipper of God. The major indicator of being a 
servant of God is always worshipping. In Islamic society this 
worshipping is realized within the boundaries of the ummah. 
Acccording to Bulaç, the pure Islamic society is classless and 
there is no hegemony of any class and individual within the 
society. In the Quran there is a differentiation of rich and 
poor peoples but it is not fixed into Marxist class concept,36 
According to Bulaç, capitalism symbolizes property and 
power. Class struggle is the determining charactaristics of 
capitalism. Although a small seetion of society profits from 
property and prosperity, workers have only labour power. Trade 
unions do not really defend natural and legal right of the 
workers. 37 According to Bulaç workers who have lost their own 
revolutionary activities have integrated into the system throug~ 
the trade unions in which they are organized. 
r-: 
!• 
Furthermore in 
capitalism money and capital are over emphasized. Capitalism and 
technological civilization has risen on the shoulder of the 
exploited, and killed peoples of the world. 
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For Bulaç, finally, the bourgeoisie and proletariat are 
the mainand opposing classes of capitalist society. But with 
modernism, involving imperialism, colonialism and neo-
colonialism, the world is divided into two main classes: on the 
one side prosperous countries of the West and on the other side 
undeveloped or developing countries that are facing with 
poverty,3 8 
Moreover, Bulaç talks about two main destructive tendencies 
of capitalist relations. The first is the exploitation of 
workers and secondly the destruction of social relations, 
structure and value systems. The capitalist world 
moral 
view, 
idealizing money and capital, has violated and destroyed moral 
values. On this point. Bulaç refers to the deterioration of the 
position of women in society and the destruction of familial 
relationships. 
In considering 
essential principles: 
fascism, Bul aç 
nationalism 
says fascism has three 
depending on race theory, 
statism deminating over social and economic sphere and war aiming 
at expansion and demination over the world.39 
Bulaç evaluates the emergence of fascism with the weakness 
of the liberal state and against the danger of, communist 
powers. According to Bulaç, fascism depends on the totalitarian 
state idea and rejects democracy and parliamentary regime. It 
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supports absolute and pure statism; in fascism, monopolies and 
ologopolies and trade unions are under the state rule. 
On the other hand, in socialist and communist countries a 
kind of state capitalism is dominant. For Bulaç socialist and 
communist countries can not remove class conflict. The pressure 
of the state has increased in these systems. For Bulaç socialism 
and communism are systems of pressure and exploitation -which 
militate against self esteem, honour of the human being. These 
systems, for Bulaç, legitimise social injustice. 
Briefly for Bulaç all these systems, capitalism, fascism 
and socialism do not involve the universal justice, high moral 
values and do not satify human well-being products of a certain 
history and culture can not be a source of happiness peace for 
humanity due to their philosophical and inner features.4° At the 
core of these three systems, 
alienation and tyranny. 
there are injustice, exploitation, 
systems have Moreover, all these 
exported their erises to all world with its culture, · commodities 
and politics. Henceforth there is no benefit from communism, 
capitalism and fascism to humanity and to the world. Bul aç 
indicates the necessity of a new worldview, 
and new life style for the well-being 
moral value syste~7 
of individuals and 
societies. For Bulaç this 'new' worldview is Islam with its 
divine order, and monotheism. Only Islam can be the remedy for 
the erises of systems, societies and individuals, with its 
divine order and nonmundane base. 
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According to Bulaç, what differentiates Islam from other 
systems is that it is based on the recognition of God's unity. 
It is not a mundane order which has been constituted as a result 
of histarical development. Islam has required a different social 
order, economic organization, different culture and 
civilization.41 
Moreover Bulaç makes the differentiation of two side of men. 
The first side of men is the mundane side which symbolizes greed, 
mercilessness, 
men has pain, 
he lives in 
weakness and egoism. However the human side of 
love, nostalgia. In this human side, although 
this world, he knows that he is alien to this 
world.42 In Bulaç's view, the west symbolizes the mundane side 
and Islam represents the human side of men. 
Additionally, according to Bulaç, in Islamic culture the 
hearth is at the cantre of the human organization not the brain. 
This thinking · is opposing to rationalism and positivism which 
puts scientific thinking and knowledge at the center of human 
activities.43 
Bulaç is against the humanist worldview. Humanism for Bulaç 
requires the freedom of individuals and their sovereignty in the 
world. So for thim humanism is against the divine order of God 
which requires the oneness of and deity of God.44 
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E) BULAÇ'S UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURAL AUTHENTICTY AND NATIVISM; 
One important feature of Bulaç's writings is the emphasis on 
nativism. In some cases, it is indicated that the appeal of 
Islamic movements lies in the desire for cultural authenticity 
and the rejection of westernization as a kind of cultural 
imperialism tied to the economic and political demination of the 
Islamic world by the west,45 "By a nativist movement, 
anthropologists usually mean a movement that seeks to revive the 
ostensibly traditional culture of a dominated society so as to 
overcome at least some aspects of the demination to which the 
society in question has been subjected. Such movements typically 
occur when people feel that their cultural identity as well as 
their economic and political autonomy is threatened by the 
demination of an alien society."46 
According 
intended to 
generations. 
reconstruction 
to Munson nativistic movements are ostensibly 
revive tradition, the culture of preceding 
However, in fact, they always involve the 
of tradition in novel (or modern) ways that 
reflect the influence of the dominant culture they are designed 
to reject.47 
Therefore, according to Munson there are two main features 
of nativistic movements in general. The first is the desire to 
return to their authentic [Islamic] identity. The second is 
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their tendeney to reinterpret the traditional culture they seek 
to revive in terms of the dominant culture they seek to reject.48 
From this point of view Ali Bulaç's wrirtings can be 
analyzed. According to Bulaç a truly Islamic society existed 
only in the period extending from the advent of Islam through the 
rule of the first four caliphs.49 Bulaç has invited the Muslims 
to return to their authentic Islamic identity. But this Islamic 
identity was not involving purely at the Ottoman period. He 
talks about the period of the Golden Age (Asr-i Saadet). 
However on the other hand, as in the second feature of 
nativistic movement, Bulaç in some cases condemns Marxism as a 
materialistic product of the decadent west.so He interprets 
history as a continuous struggle between God's unity and 
polytheism and reconstructs history in a novel (modern) way by 
using dialectical Marxist terminology. 
F) ALI BULAÇ'S ISLAMIC MODEL; 
In Bulaç's wrirings although there are some indications 
about the pure Islamic society, the re is not enough 
satisfactory explanation of the possible ways of resching this 
Islamic society. 
According to Bulaç's, in an ideal Islamic society there 
will be no classes. While recognising differences in status, 
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weal th,. and tribal origin, the Quran teaches the ultimate 
transnational unity and equality of all believers before God. In 
the Quran there is a differentiation of rich and poor peoples but 
they do not represent any class or government power. However, 
although there will be an economic differentiation, all men will 
be equal before the Islamic law.sı In Bulaç's model 
intellectuals are crucial in the organization and enlightenment 
of the society. 
Intellectuals, for Bulaç, will guide their societies and 
will be the administrators of Islamic society, because they will 
know Islam, Quran and Sunna perfectly and will transmit their 
knowledge to other peoples.s2 
Bulaç's 
view. For 
happiness is 
model of Islamic society is based on the 'ummah' 
him, individuals are mortal. However absolute 
eternal. So individuals who are mortal, are 
meaningful in the ummah society. 
In Bulaç's view ummah is more important than state, as 
states can change while the ummah has continuity. For Bulaç, 
ummah is not the only community of peoples that have same belief, 
~nd it is not constituted by only Muslims. 'Ummah' is a social 
structure that consists of different peoples and communities who 
ıave various beliefs but have the desire to unifi and live 
~ogether. s 3 
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The divine law is above the ummah and state which takes its 
legitimacy from Islamic law. 
In this respect I want to discuss the views of Bulaç about 
the state structure of Muslim societies. According to him recent 
states of the third world countries of many Islamic societies are 
the puppets of Western bloc. But he did not give much attention 
to the state structure of current Muslim countries. 
For him in societies where civil dynamics have weaknesses 
against the political society, the state has the hegemony over 
all civil dynamics. In these type of societies the acquisition 
of the state means the acqusition of the whole society. 
"In a western societies the activities and hegemony of 
politics are limited by the civil societal elements and 
institutions, but in Eastern societies, especially within the 
last three centuries, political society has becpme powerful 
against the civil societal elements (tarikats, educational 
institutions, mosque Quran courses ... ) and become the unique 
determinant within the society."54 
According to Bulaç, p the Golden Age period of Muslim history 
represented a pure civil period; it lasted until middle of the 
Abbasid period. After this period, the state had a more 
dominant role over the civil elements and this has continued up 
to now.ss 
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From this point of view, for Bulaç, the signs of above 
mentioned ummah and civil societal elements can be observed in 
the tMadina Doctrine' in which Jews, Muslims and other peoples 
agreed to live in consensus. So the state could not have 
definite formal ideology because of the pluralistic structure of 
the ummah. 
Bulaç, with these views, gives his attention to the 
principles of civil societal elements and rejects the formal 
state ideology above the society. Nevertheless his explanations 
about the base of the state at tMadina doctrine' gives rise to 
some weaknesses in his views about the pluralistic ummah society. 
For this view, in the Madina doctrine there are two 
legitimate bases of the state. The first is the divine message 
and the other is the voluntary agreement. However, it can be 
seen that these two bases are in contradiction to each other. On 
the one side is the divine message based on the 'tevhid' 
(oneness) principle and on the other side various communities and 
peoples who have different belief systems. 
I think Bulaç makes very crucial contributions to the 
arguments of civil society and ideal ummah based on Islamic 
society. Neverthless his arguments are not sufficient and 
powerful enough to show us the pluralism or non-traditionalism of 
this pure ideal Islamic society, because Bulaç proposes a 
society that will take its legitimacy and base from the absolute 
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truth (divine message of God). Therefore I think that Bulaç's 
view is in contradiction with itself since a society that will 
take its legitimacy and base from the absolute and one truth, as 
Bulaç proposes, can not involve in itself the telaration of 
plurality. · 
Moreover, although Bulaç thinks radically, criticizes 
modern systems and proposes the return to the period of 'Asr-i 
Saadet', he does not sufficiently show the possible ways to 
reach a such society. 
Bulaç does not support the political party struggle to reach 
Islamic society, he evaluates the political party struggle as an 
adaptation to the system. For Bulaç, if Muslims are rejecting 
the status-quo in the name of Islam they have to show the real 
goals to the masses. The support of western discourses with 
Islamic concepts and phrases can not show the real light to 
Muslim masses,56 Bulaç criticizes the Refah Party in Turkey 
because of its goals of development, industrialization and to 
reach social welfare. However for Bulaç the aim is not to reach 
welfare but salvation (Felah). Additionally, the discourse of 
many Islamic intellectuals and the views of Islamic ~ universit~ 
youth about technology and industry are not in agreement with the 
Refah Party's industrialization projects. The view of the 
National Outlook (Milli-Görüş) formulated by National Salvation 
Party and 'Refah Party' line - sees the realization of economic 
68 
growth as the basic means of breaking the chains of the world 
capitalist system and creating the great Turkey,5 7 According to 
the 1 National outlook' of RP, industrialisation is a matter of 
life and death. It is the major factor in gaining economic 
independence and usperiority. Moreover, because of their non-
industrialized positions, less developed countries of the third 
world have been subject to the demination of the industrialized 
countries. 58 However for Bulaç the liberty of Muslim societies 
can only be realized by totally abcndening the technology and 
industry, of the West. But he does not indicate how this will 
be realized. 
G) UNIVERSAL REVIVALISM OF RELIGION AND ISLAM; 
~ 
In the · last years not only in Islamic societies that are 
not-industrialized or developed but also in the industrialized 
western countries there is an existence of movements to protest 
the recent systems and to propose the solving of problems within 
the religious perspective.s9 Among many secular intellectual 
this phenomenon was argued and debated in the 1980s. Bulaç also 
gives great attention to the revivalism of Islam an a universal 
scale. 
According to Bulaç, in the next decades all political and 
social trends will be religious. The ideologies, philosophies 
and doctrines that constitute the base of modern society will 
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lose their relevance, because modern society has caused the 
psychological, cultural and social destruction of the 
individual. For Bulaç, individuals who ave become isolated and 
frustrated because of industrialisation will experience the 
mysticism and inner self satisfaction-that is the introversion of 
individuals to search for some meaning to life and society. 
Individuals are acquiring the cosmic spiritual side of religion 
without being aware of it. The plurality of institutions, high 
degree of division of labour and specialisation has caused the 
division of human mind and consciousness which are the two main 
realities of personality. So, for Bulaç in the modern society 
individuals feel themselves as lonely anomic and homeless. 
Moreover, protest movements are marginal activities in 
Western countries, and the evaluated by Bulaç as the outcome of 
this modern life style. All the marginal groups protest at the 
tegular and definite structure of modern society. For Bulaç, 
they demand identity and freedem from their anomic position. In 
Bulaç's view although it is seen as pluralist, modern society is 
not suitable for socio-cultural diversities. Therefore, 
,.., 
r 
'"ll individuals within modern society are not happy and satisfied as
is shown. The only possible way to escape the hallmarks of 
modernism is the universal message of religion; with religion 
lost identity is regained. With kinship and neighborhood 
relations men can feel himself as in his home. In the framework 
of the religious message there is a feeling of identity and 
belonging to somewhere. 
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For Bulaç, Islam has a greater chance to affect the large 
masses. Because it is suitable for the principles of tTevhid' 
(oneness and unity of God) and justice. 6 0 
Lastly, · for Bulaç in many Islamic countries the revivalism 
of Islam is lived; the hallmarks of modernism are broker with 
the universal message of Islam that based on divine revelation of 
God to prophet Muhammed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It could be said that Bulaç is a defender of civil Islam. 
Instead of a political party struggle to reach pure Islamic 
society, he supports the view of civil struggle. Individuals 
with their consciousness will start to live and desire the ·~- • <) ... ~~ ~ "' pure 
Islamic society. As I conclude from his writings Islamization 
will be acquir.ed from below to above. 
\ 
It is realized in human 
thought and behaviour by the endeavors of the human themselves. 
Here the common point is the assumption which foresees a change 
"·" 
that depends on change in consiousness. So for him this 
consiousness ·will be start with the quest for inner spiritual 
satl~faction. But Bulaç has no satisfactory explanation as to 
how this transformation will be achieved. 
Moreover, from all of his writings Bulaç emerges as a 
strong supporter and defender of 'civil society'. In Bulaç's 
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ideal Islamic society civil elements will be dominant as in the 
period of the four caliphs and up to mid Abbasid time. According 
to him the Madina doctrine has shown us the possibility of 
construction Islamic society in which various ethnic and 
' ' 
religious groups can live together. 
However in some cases he is in conflict with himself. On 
the one hand, the divine message will be the source of law and 
knowledge and this divine message represents the revelation of 
God to the prophet Muhammad. On the other side he is talking 
about the pluralistic Islamic society that will be based on 
contractual relationships between different groups. I think that 
the question can be asked to Bulaç that is there a really 
possibility of pluralism and civil societal elements in such a 
society where the sacred truth will be accepted only as the 
divine revelation to prophet Muhammad. 
However, although they have some internal weaknesses and 
conflicts, Bulaç's writings are stil! significant. He deals 
with broad scale points. Modernism is his main interest but he 
also writes about the christianity, capitalism, fascism~ 
Marxism .... So it is reasonable to accept his importance within 
the intellectual life of the post 1980s. His books and 
publichings are among the best sellers and are read by both 
secular peoples and Islamic youth and environments. 
72 
NOTES AND REFERENCES; 
1) Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt Against 
Industry and Techonology", 
324. 
Ankara, 1992, Typescript, p. 
2) ömer Laçiner, "Dini Akımların Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de 
Islami Hareket" BİRİKİM, Ekim (1989): 6-15, p. 6 and also 
see Topral, typescript, p. 325. 
3) Michaell E. Meeker "The new Muslim Intellectuals in the 
Republic of Turkey", in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, Richard 
Tapper, ed. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1991), p. 217 and also see Elisabeth özdalga, "East and West 
as Symbols of Good and Evil, Turkish Muslim Intellectuals 
Facing Modernity", typescript, p. 6. 
4) Ali Bulaç, ed., ISLAM DÜNYASINDA 'DÜŞÜNCE SORUNLARI 
(Istanbul; işaret publishing, 1988), p. 172. 
5) Ibid., p. 172. 
6) Ali Bulaç; DİN VE MODERNİZM (Istanbul: Endülüs Yayınları, 
1991), p. 44. 
7) Tonny Barnett, ed., SOCIOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT (London, 
Melbourne; Hutchinson Publishing, 1988), p, 26. 
8) 'Modernization refers to a type of social change since the 
18th century, which consists in the economic or political 
advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in 
follower societies'. Richard Bendix, "Tradition and 
Modernity Reconsidered", vol: IX, no. 3, April 1967 and also 
73 
see Wilbert E. Moore, ed., SOCIAL CHANGE (New Jersey, 
Printice Hall; 1964), p. 89. 
9) Barnett, p. 26. 
10) Pete~ Worsley, ed., THE NEW INTRODUCING SOCIOLOGY (Canada; 
Penguin Books, 1987), p. 242. 
ll) Barnett, p. 32. 
12) Bulaç, 1988, p. 185. 
13) Ali Bulaç, "Dinlerin Meydan Okuyuşu; Entegrizm ve 
Fundamentalizm" BiRiKiM, may (1992): 17-29, p. 19. 
14) Bulaç, 1991, p. 162. 
15) Bulaç, 1992 (May), p. 21. 
16) Ibid., p. 26. 
17) Bulaç, 1988, p. 27. 
18) Bulaç, 1992 (May), p. 27. 
19) Nilüfer Göle, ed. MODERN MAHREM, MEDENiYET VE ÖRTÜNME 
(Istanbul: Metiş Publishing, 1991), p. 109. 
20) Ibid., 107. 
21) Bulaç, 1988, p. 72. 
22) Göle, 1991, p. 109. 
23) Ali Bulaç, ed. iNSANIN ÖZGÜRLÜK ARAYISI (Istanbul: Endülüs >~ 
!• 
Publishing, 1991), p. 41. 
24) Toprak, typescript, p. 326. 
25) Ibid., p. 326. 
26) Bulaç, 1988, p. 76. 
74 
27) Ali Bulaç, ed. CAGDAS KAVRAMLAR VE DÜZENLER, (Istanbul; 
28) 
29) 
30) 
31) 
3'2) 
33) 
34) 
35) 
36) 
37) 
Endülüs Publishing, 1992b), p. 65. 
Bulaç, 1991 (b)' p. 48. 
Bulaç, 1992(b) p. 193. 
Bulaç, 1991 ( a)' p.' 56. 
Bulaç, 1988, p. 88. 
Bulaç, 1991(a), p. 63. 
Bulaç, 1992 ( a)' p. 26. 
Ibi d. , p. 27. 
Bulaç, 1988, p. 46. 
Bulaç, 1992 (b)' p. 167. 
Ibi d. , p, 35-160, p. 146. 
38) Ibid., p. 145. 
39) Zeliha Aslıtürk, "the Development of an Islamic Intellectual 
40) 
41) 
42) 
43) 
44) 
career· ~niTurkey; The case of Ali Bula~", unpublished 
master's thesis, METU, Ankara, 1990, p. 59. 
Bulaç,\ 1992 (b)' p. 162. 
Bulaç, 19_88' p. 19. 
-' '\' 
Bulaç, 1991 (b) ' p. 60. 
Ibi d. , p. 63. 
Bulaç, ~988, p. 202. -. 
45) Henry JR. Munson, ed., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1988), 
p. 119. 
46. Ibid., p. 311. 
75 
Ibi d. , p. 312. 
Ibi d. , p. 311. 
47) 
48) 
49) 
50) 
51) 
52) 
53) 
54) 
55) 
Toprak, ibid., p. 332. 
Munson, 1988, p. lll. 
' 
Bulaç, 1992 (b) ' p. 250. 
Bulaç, 1988, p. 116. 
I b id. , p. 106. 
Bulaç, 1992 (b) ' p. 80. 
Ibi d. , p. 84. 
56) Ibid., p. ~70. 
57) Ruşen Çakır, AYET VE SLOGAN, TÜRKİYE'DE iSLAMİ OLUSUMLAR 
(Istanbul; Metiş Publishing, 1990), p. 224. 
58) Ahmet Yıldız, "The evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey 
along the NSP-PP line with special reference to changes and 
continuities, unpublished master's thesis, 1990, Ankara, 
Bilkent University, p. 62. 
-
59) Laçiner, 1989, p. 6. 
60) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 271-272. 
76 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this study was to examine how and why the 
contemporary Islamic thinkers of Turkey, respond to the 
problematic of modernizm and westernizm. 
My major point is that the desire to return to Islam as an 
indigenous culture and political framework is sourced by 
indigenous dynamics and by multi dimensional external pressures. 
It is a response to the national erises that has been in large 
part shaped by the impact of Westernization and modernization 
processes which are also related to the western colonialism and 
imperialism. 
the 
Modernization in general is defined as the replacement 
old by-the new or more specifically it is the process 
of 
that 
implies industrialization, urbanization, expansion of secular 
education, 
dimunition 
religious, 
greater public participation in government and the 
of the legal and social role of the ethnic, 
and other primordial identities.ı In other words, 
modernization is deseribed as the transition from pre-industrial 
to_ industrial society, or in sociological concepts, shift from 
'gemeinschaft' to 'gesellschaft'. 
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The Islamic intellectuals with their fundamentalist outlook 
have brought a new expression to the Islamic movements in Turkey 
during 1980s. Their fundamentalist discourse is full of 
different responses to West and modernism; what many of them are 
proposing instead of the modern society is an ideal Islamic 
society that would take its legitimacy from the knowledge of 
Quran and Sunnah. 
Ali Bulaç is one example of the Islamic response to the 
rapid modernization and westernization process of Turkey. In 
Bulaç's rhetoric, the wish to return to Islam as an indigenous 
culture and a political framework appears as a response to the 
national erises caused by modernisation. In general, what Bulaç 
understands from modernizm is its cultural and individual levels. 
According to him with the modern cities which are the places 
of formal state ideologies, the gemeinschaftlich relationships 
are destroyed and individuals are isolated from each other. 
Within modern cities, huge industry, division of labour and 
specialization has caused an atomization of individuals and their 
feeling of homolessness and identity crises. 
Bulaç strongly supports the community life. For him the 
ideal Islamic society is based on an ummah consisting of various 
peoples and communities who have different beliefs but have a 
desire to live together. 
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In Bulaç's view identity should be acquired with kinship and 
neghborhood, mutual aid and solidarity that will construct the 
bases of society. 
From this framework, I can say that, Bulaç's grievances 
lie with social modernization rather than his opposition to 
. 
technological and economic modernization. He mostly deals with 
the changes of consumption patterns, values, norms, life 
styles and relationships of individuals. In this sense 
modernization implies more than just the replacement of the old 
by the new. It implies a shift from a society in which peoples 
social and legal status is largely determined by characteristics 
they are usually born with, to one in which social and legal 
status is largely determined by what people achieve by their own 
efforts. 2 ·I~~ sum Bulaç rejects the modern identity and modern 
societal relationships. 
i 
However, ·. Bulaç is a product of modern society, His own 
modern identity shaped by a secular university education, could 
not give him the chance to break these ties totally. He uses 
secular scient~fic methods; footnotes, references, statistical 
summaries and bibliographical lists in his writings, He dresses 
lfke a modern man and his method of writing reflects the signs of 
secular thought. Therefore Ali Bulaç can not break the chains of 
modernizm beyond his rejection of it. He is a part of the 
current system, that has inevitable effects on his discourse. 
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Despite his radicalism he did not escape from the effects of 
modernizm. 
Aditionally, the writings of Bulaç proposes the radical 
: ' 
tlransformation of society. This radicalism aims at the 
establishment of a new world based on the principles of the Quran 
and the Sunnah. However "no blueprint for this transformation is 
offered; there is talk of a political struggle, but exactly ho 
this struggle will be carried out remains unclear; there is to 
be a transformation in the course of which modern technology and 
industry will be destroyed, but what precisely is to replace 
them is not discussed; the reduction of the relationships of a 
relatively complex society to their simpler forms is advocated, 
but there is no analysis of how this process is tQ be 
undertaken."3 
Therefore,· Ali Bulaç's social model is a kind of Utopia. 
In all utopias, it involves an abstraction of tim~ and locale 
which is supposed to be valid for all times and places. 
The utopia of Bulaç is an ideal Islamic society that is to 
be established as was established by the prophet Muhammad an~ 
four calips periods of the Golden Age in which full submission to 
Go d resulted in "absolute justice", "equality" and 
"brotherhood". The principles of this Islamic society will be 
based on Quran and Sunnah with full submission to God. 4 However 
. 
there is a weaknesses due to his comparison of the Ideal Islamic 
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society and current Islamic societies. This is a full of 
abstractions because the utopic ideal Islamic society and current 
ıslamic societies (take their legitimacy from the Islamic rule 
i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia ... ) are not fixe to each other. Bulaç 
is continuously making the critics of Western societies but he 
does not evaluate current Islamic societies in terms of their 
political and social contradictions to the ideal Islamic society. 
Moreover, Bulaç attempts to substitute a more activist 
response to west and modernization than the notion of passive 
endurance that is especially common among the poorest and least 
educated strata of Islamic societies. 5 Munson indicates that 
"one of the Quranic verses commonly cited in the fundamentalist 
literature is 'God does not change the condition of a people 
until people change themselves.' This. centrast between 
fundamentalist activism and popular fatalism is one of the most 
striking differences between fundamentalist Islamic ideology and 
popular Islam~"6 
Almost all of his writings reflects the breaking of this 
fatalism and he proposes the struggle to modernism to reach a 
pure Islamic society. But this is not a political struggle. He 
does not have any political program. Bulaç proposes that 
Islamizatian process is realized in human tought that 
Islamizatian process is realized in human tought and behaviour by 
the endavors of the Muslim themselves. Here the main point is 
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the assumption which foresees a change that depends on a change 
in consciousness. 
As I guess from his writings, these consciousness 
transformatian be realized by propaganda and education. This 
required education will be given by Islamic thinkers to the 
Muslim believers with using media and communication systems. In 
this point, I want to indicate that, contemporary Islamic 
thinkers in Turkey at 1980's caused to emergence of 'elitism' 
among Islamic groups. On the one hand large Muslim believers on 
the other hand Islamic thinkers who are writing on various 
periodicals to make Muslim masses aware about world events and 
Islamic knowledge. Thus, these Islamic thinkers including Ali 
Bulaç became the 'ideolouges' of Muslim believers. 
Regardless of their programs for the future, many of 
_Islamic thinker consider Islam an indigenous culture, a divine 
belief system and a political ideology which can be used as a 
means ta break away from the west. But as seen in Bulaç's 
writings they do not have a coherent and consistent response what 
they reject. Islamic ideology does not seem to be as origina~f 
perfect and radical as Bulaç's rhetoric assert. 
Additionally this study showed that; the erises of 
modernist ideologies existing in the Muslim countries have forced 
Islam to challenge these ideologies which could not sufficiently 
fulfill the needs of the masses. Nevertheless, as far as, it 
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was observed from the writings of Bulaç, Islam is not a proper 
situation to handle this histerical chance. It has become this 
worldly as an alternative ideology. 
On the other hand, although they have internal weaknesses 
and conflicts, Bulaç's writings are stil! significant. He deals 
with broad scale points. Modernism is his main interest but he 
also writes about christianity, poltheism, capitalism, fascism, 
marxism, civil-society, military cops ... ete. So it is 
reasonable to accept his importance within the intellectual life 
of the post 1980's. His books and publications are among the 
best seliers and are read by both secular and Islamic youth. His 
writing style is praised by many secular intellectual. Therefore 
Bulaç has gained special place among the Islamic and secular 
intellectuals of 1980s. 
This point also reminds us of the cruciality of the 1980's 
in terms of the rise of cansensus among various polar rhetorics. 
The respectable debates are realized among Islamists, rightists 
and leftists in this decade. The Islamic intellectuals have 
represented the one wing of this debate. But they could not go 
further from their writings. As in the case of Ali Bulaç, they 
are part of the current system and it seems that their 'radical' 
rhetoric is far away from program for change. However they are 
the part of the democratization process of Turkish society. 
Islamic peoples represents the one polar of Turkish society and 
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as other polars they have a right to make heard their voices 
within the boundaries of liberal demecratic society. 
,· 
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